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Chapter Seventeen
Of Visible Race-Consciousness and
Institutional Role: Equal Protection and
Disparate Impact after Ricci and
Inclusive Communities
Richard Primus*
Six years ago, Ricci v. DeStefano1 foregrounded the possibility that statutory
disparate-impact standards like the one in Title VIl might be on a collision course
with the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. For many observers, it
was a radically new possibility. Until that point, disparate-impact doctrine had
usually been understood as an ally of equal protection rather than as a potentially
conflicting aspect of the law. But between the 1970s and the beginning of the present
century, equal protection doctrine became more individualistic and less tolerant of
race-conscious actions intended to redress inherited racial hierarchies. Those developments put equal protection in increasing tension with disparate-impact doctrine,
which is reasonably understood as race-conscious and which takes groups rather than
individuals as a basic unit of analysis. 2 The Supreme Court officially ducked the
possibility of a constitutional conflict in Ricci, but the fact of potential conflict-and,
accordingly, the potential end of statutory disparate-impact standards in racediscrimination cases3-was brought squarely into view.
After Ricci was decided, I identified three possible readings of that decision and
explained that the continued viability of disparate-impact doctrine depended on the
choice among them. They are a general reading, an institutional reading, and a
* Theodore J. St. Antoine Collegiate Professor, The University of Michigan Law School.
Portions of the argument presented here were originally published as part of The Future ofDisparate
Impact, 108. MICH. L. REV. 1341 (2010). For help with research, I thank Virginia Niesler and the
staff of the University of Michigan Law Library. The work of writing this paper was supported by
a grant from the Cook Endowment at the University of Michigan Law School.
1
557 U.S. 557 (2009).
2 For a complete discussion of this development and the potential legal conflict, see Richard A.
Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate Impact: Round Three, 117 HARV. L. REV. 493 (2003).
3
Disparate impact cases sometimes involve discrimination on the basis of characteristics other
than race, including sex and age. The analysis in this paper is most relevant to race cases. When I
write in this paper about disparate-impact scenarios and do not specify the axis of discrimination,
I mean to be referring to scenarios raising issues of disparate impact on the basis of race.
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visibility reading.4 According to the general reading, Ricci stood for the proposition
that the actions necessary to remedy a disparate-impact violation are per se in
conceptual conflict with the demands of equal protection. Disparate-impact doctrine
is race conscious; equal protection requires racial neutrality; the two are not
compatible. Several observers seem to have regarded the general reading as
straightforward-from a variety of normative perspectives.11 And that reading would
likely have been fatal for disparate-impact doctrine as applied to discrimination on
the basis of race.& But the general reading was not the only available reading of Ricci,
and it was probably not the best reading, even at the time when Ricci was decided.
Today, after the Court's further decision in Texas Department of Housing and
Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, 7 the general seems even less
likely to prevail. And if the general reading of Ricci will not carry the day,
disparate-impact standards will survive.11 More particularly, it will survive in a form
compatible with at least one of the other two possible readings of Ricci-the
institutional reading and the visibility reading. So it pays to consider those readings
in depth and in the further light that Inclusive Communities sheds.
The institutional reading of Ricci focuses on a difference between courts and
public employers. On this view, the Court's ruling in Ricci was predicated on the fact
that the case presented a disparate-impact remedy imposed preemptively by a public
employer rather than a disparate-impact claim adjudicated by a court. The institutional reading teaches that a municipal employer's attempts to remedy its own
potential disparate-impact violations are likely to violate equal protection not because
all disparate-impact remedies are discriminatory but because public employers,
unlike courts, are not authorized to engage in the race-conscious decisionmaking that
disparate-impact remedies entail. Judges are responsible for remedying racial
discrimination, and that task requires more leeway to take note of race than other
4

I originally called the third reading the "visible-victims" reading. See Richard A. Primus, The
Future of Disparate Impact, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1341, 1369-74. In the time since I first developed
the typology, however, I have realized that it is more accurate to use the label "visibility." The key
fact in this paradigm is visibility of the race-consciousness of a governmental intervention. Visible
victims are important because innocent and identifiable victims lend themselves to catchy narratives
of injustice that raise the visibility of the practices that victimize them. But the importance of victims
is in this way derivative-as a step toward the thing that ultimately matters, which is visibility. With
this improved understanding, I will here speak of a "visibility reading" of Ricci rather than a
"visible-victims reading." See generally Henslee v. Union Planters Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 335 U.S.
595, 600 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("Wisdom too often never comes, and so one ought not
to reject it merely because it comes late.").
5 See Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2682 (Scalia, J., concurring); see Ronald Dworkin, Justice Sotomayor:
The Unjust Hearings, N.Y. Rev. Books, Sept 24, 2009, at 37, 39.
6 At the least, it would have subjected disparate-impact standards to strict scrutiny in such cases.
In cases where the axis of discrimination was not race, it may only have subjected disparate-impact
standards to some lesser degree of scrutiny, and disparate-impact liability would have had an
accordingly greater chance of survival.
7 _U.S. _ , 192 L.Ed.2d 514, 2015 U.S. LExis 4249, 83 U.S.L.W. 4555 (June 25, 2015).
8
In the foreseeable term-a caveat that should be appended to all such predictions. I leave aside,
inter alia, the possible effects of a change in the Court's membership.

297

RICCI AND INCLUSIVE COMMUNITIES

public officials have. (A requirement of complete judicial colorblindness would
thoroughly undermine antidiscrimination law as we know it, because courts cannot
assess garden-variety discrimination claims without knowing the race of the parties
involved.) In contrast, public employers face pressures that make it unwise to leave
them with too much discretion to invoke disparate-impact doctrine to justify racially
conscious hiring decisions. If Ricci is read through this institutional lens, courts can
continue to enforce Title VIl's disparate-impact doctrine, even if public employers
will have to tread carefully when addressing potential disparate-impact problems that
arise within their own institutions.
Third and last, there is a visibility reading. It holds that the problem in Ricci was
not the race-consciousness of the defendant's decision per se but the fact that the
decision disadvantaged determinate and visible innocent third parties, thus making
the racially allocative aspect of the defendant's actions publicly salient. Ricci
concerned a promotions process in the fire department of New Haven, Connecticut.
One phase of the process involved a written test, and the test had a severely adverse
statistical impact on African-American firefighters. When the city discovered that
disparate impact, it nullified the results of the test and went back to the drawing board
rather than completing the promotions process as originally advertised. That course
of action created a group of determinate individuals who were stripped of their
successful advance to the next stage of the promotions process-that is, the
firefighters, all of them white, 9 who scored well enough on the test to be eligible for
promotions. 10 Most disparate-impact remedies avoid creating such victims. And
within the category of formally race-neutral actions intended to improve the position
of disadvantaged racial groups, equal protection doctrine may well distinguish
between those that have visible victims and those whose costs are more diffuse. 11
Many people to both the left and the right of the Supreme Court-indeed, certain
people at the left and right of the Supreme Court-may consider this distinction
unprincipled. If race-conscious decisionmaking is objectionable, one might contend,
then it is objectionable whether its allocative effects are visible or not. Conversely, if
some race-conscious decisionmaking is permissible, its permissibility should not
depend on its being kept secret. These objections have force. That said, the
distinction between more and less visible race-conscious interventions is already
present in equal protection case law, 12 and it may well be defensible, or even wise.
9 One of these firefighters was identified in published reports as both white and Latino. See
Primus, The Future of Disparate Impact, supra note 4, at 1342 n. 2.
1

°

For a more thorough discussion of the facts of Ricci, see Primus, The Future of Disparate
Impact, supra note 4, at 1348.
11 See Primus, The Future of Disparate Impact, supra note 4, at 1369-75; cf. Lawrence Lessig,
Erie-Effects of Volume IIO: An Essay on Context in Interpretive Theory, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1785
(1997) (describing the ways in which an issue's moving from the background to the foreground of
public consciousness can change constitutional doctrine's approach to that issue).
12

See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 787-89
(2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S.
630, 647 (1993) (stating that in some equal protection cases, "appearances do matter''); City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 507 (1989).
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And on a visibility model, Title VIl's disparate-impact doctrine can survive, because
the standard judicial remedies all avoid creating visible victims: the Ricci plaintiffs
suffered in the New Haven case only because the city acted more aggressively than
a court enforcing a disparate-impact order would have.1a
The recent decision in Inclusive Communities strongly suggests that the Court-or
at least its median Justice-is not on board with the general reading. Inclusive
Communities arose under the Fair Housing Act14 rather than Title vn, but the
underlying conceptual relationship between disparate-impact doctrine and equal
protection is the same. The question presented in Inclusive Communities was whether
disparate impact is a cognizable theory of liability under the Fair Housing Act.
Writing for a 5-4 majority, Justice Anthony Kennedy answered in the affirmative. As
a formal matter, such a judgment about statutory meaning need say nothing about the
constitutional permissibility of disparate-impact standards. But if Justice Kennedy
took seriously the possibility that disparate-impact standards in race-discrimination
cases are per se unconstitutional, he might well have avoided the constitutional
conflict by construing the Fair Housing Act not to include a disparate-impact
standard. Such a construction might or might not be the best interpretation of the
statute, but it would have been plausible. The language of the Fair Housing Act does
not mention disparate impact, and four Justices did conclude that disparate-impact
actions should not lie under the statute. Moreover, construing the Fair Housing Act
not to create liability for disparate impact would have been consistent with Justice
Kennedy's approach to the interpretation of the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act15 ("ADEA") in a substantially analogous case. In Smith v. City of Jackson,
Justice Kennedy joined Justice Sandra Day O'Connor's opinion concluding that the
ADEA does not create a cause of action for employment practices that have disparate
impacts based on age. 16 The dissenters in Inclusive Communities in several respects
replayed arguments from Justice O'Connor's opinion in Smith. In short, it would
have been both easy on a blank slate and broadly in step with his own previously
articulated views for Justice Kennedy to avoid a potential constitutional infirmity in
the Fair Housing Act by reading that statute not to include a disparate-impact
standard. His conclusion that the Fair Housing Act does make disparate impact
actionable thus signals a lack of a concern about such a constitutional problem.

Inclusive Communities might further suggest that the Court is more preoccupied
with the issues animating the visibility reading than the issues animating the
institutional reading. To be sure, one should not overread Inclusive Communities. The
case did not require the Court to grapple with the concerns of the institutional
reading, because it did not involve a public agency's attempt to impose a
13 See

In re Employment Discrimination Litig., 198 F.3d 1305, 1315 (11th Cir. 1999)
(explaining that the principal disparate impact remedy is enjoining the employer against future use
of the challenged practice). As the above analysis suggests, a court could adopt the institutional and
visible-victim readings simultaneously.
14 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq.
15 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq.
16 544 U.S. 228, 247 (2005) (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment, joined by Kennedy and
Thomas, JJ.).
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race-conscious remedy for its own disparate-impact violation. On the contrary, the
public agency in the case-the Texas Department of Housing and Community
Affairs-took the view that its challenged actions could not be actionable under a
disparate-impact theory at all because, in its view, the Fair Housing Act lacked a
disparate-impact standard. 17 But for what it is worth, Justice Kennedy's opinion for
the Court had one interesting point of contact with the institutional reading's
paradigm, one that suggests that the Court is not focused on those issues. The opinion
suggests greater concern with issues related to the visibility paradigm, in particular
by going out of its way to warn against the overt use of racially classificatory
remedies. 18
Part I of this paper describes the institutional reading of Ricci. Part Il describes the
visibility reading. In all likelihood, visibility is the more powerful paradigm for
explaining and predicting the trajectory of the Court's decisions. But the two
frameworks are not mutually exclusive. The Court may well be motivated by each set
of concerns as they pertinently arise.

I.

The Institutional Reading

On the institutional reading of Ricci, courts may order race-conscious remedies
for disparate-impact problems much as they did before Ricci. But public
employers' freedom to remedy disparate-impact problems after they occur is
significantly constrained by the dictates of equal protection.19

As a general matter, the requirements of a constitutional norm often vary with
the role or the capacities of the particular institutions by which (or to which) the
norm is applied. 20 The judicially enforceable content of the Equal Protection
Clause, for example, differs slightly from what Congress can do to enforce that
Clause, and the difference is intended to track differences in the roles and
capacities of the two institutions. Both institutions are authorized to enforce equal
protection, but the operationalized content of equal protection has some play in
the joints. Depending on the specific example and the underlying constitutional
theory of the commentator, the resulting differences between what a constitutional
norm demands when applied by (or to) different institutional actors can be
17
18

See, e.g., Inclusive Communities, 192 L.Ed.2d at 533.
See infra at Section IT.

19

I specify public employers rather than employers generally because, given the state action
requirement, only public employers can violate the Equal Protection Clause. To be sure, if a private
employer's efforts to cure a disparate impact problem would violate equal protection if that
employer were public, then those same efforts might well violate Title Vll's prohibition on disparate
treatment. But the concerns animating the institutional reading of Ricci are particular to public
employers and may not carry over to private ones, for reasons that the main text in this Part should
make obvious. So to the degree that the institutional reading captures the Court's perspective, it may
leave private employers more free than public employers to remedy their own disparate-impact
problems.
20

See generally Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. REv. 1, 48-50

(2004).
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described in terms of underenforcement,2 1 prophylaxis,22 judicially manageable
standards,23 or simply as the way constitutional adjudication always works. 24
However described, it is clear that constitutional norms often impose slightly
different demands on different institutional actors.
It has long been established law that the Equal Protection Clause applies to
courts as well as other governmental institutions.25 Given the role and characteristics of courts, however, not even the strongest advocates of a colorblind26
21
See Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional
Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212 (1978).
22 See David A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules, 55 U. Cm. L. REV. 190 (1988).
23 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Judicially Manageable Standards and Constitutional Meaning, 119
HARV. L. REV. 1274 (2006).
24
See Evan H. Caminker, Miranda and Some Puzzles of "Prophylactic" Rules, 70 U. CIN. L.
REV. l, 25 (2001); Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM.
L. REV. 857 (1999).
25
See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1880).
26
This term is worth unpacking. As the expression is usually used, a colorblind government is
one that takes no notice of the color, and by implication the race, of the people it governs. In a more
subtle way, however, the language of blindness is not a precise match for the view of equal
protection as a ban on racial classifications. The idea of blindness suggests the inability to perceive
some feature of the physical world that exists independent of the viewer. But race, unlike color, is
not an objective physical phenomenon. It is an intersubjective phenomenon, the product of a shared
set of meanings among a community of people who form their understandings under one another's
influences, and the government's influence bas long played a powerful role in the construction of
race. See, e.g., DAVID A. HOLLINGER, POST-ETHNIC AMERICA: BEYOND MULTICULTURALISM
32-33 (1995) (describing legal rules that have shaped racial categories and designated the race of
persons of mixed ancestry). See generally Ariela J. Gross, litigating Whiteness: Trials of Racial
Determination in the Nineteenth-Century South, 108 YALE LJ. 109 (1998) (describing the processes
by which trials have shaped racial boundaries). By invoking a paradigm of pure perception, the
metaphor of colorblindness implies that race is something apprehended rather than constructed,
thereby obscuring government's role in shaping racial categories in the first place.
This misleading feature of the term "colorblind" is not entirely incidental to the way it is used.
Obviously race-conscious government actions are today more likely to be aimed at improving the
position of historically oppressed groups than at exacerbating their disadvantage. Accordingly, the
colorblindness imagery now functions mostly to impede efforts to dismantle old racial hierarchies.
See, e.g., Alabama Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama, 135 S. Ct. 1257, 1284 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (invoking the colorblindness idea to argue against a legislative redistricting plan aimed
at increasing African-American voting strength in Alabama) (2015); Schuette v. Coalition to Defend
Affirmative Action, Integration and Immigrant Rights and Fight for Equality By Any Means
Necessary, 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1648 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (invoking the
colorblindness idea in support of a referendum banning affirmative action); Adarand, 515 U.S. at
239 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (using the colorblindness
argument to oppose affirmative action); see also Randall Kennedy, Persuasion and Distrust: A
Comment on the Affirmative Action Debate, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1327, 1334-37 (1986) (describing
the anti-affirmative-action valence of the colorblindness argument). The choice to keep government
out of active efforts to dismantle racial hierarchies seems more appropriate if those hierarchies are
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approach to equal protection have maintained that courts may never take note of
race. Taking note of race is regularly part of core judicial functions, including
those made necessary by the Equal Protection Clause. If I walk into federal district
court and sue the government for discriminating against me as a black man, the
court will, and should, notice that I am in fact a white man. That evaluation will
and should figure heavily in the court's evaluation of my claim. As a matter of
widely shared intuition, nothing about this governmental race-consciousness is an
equal protection problem. 27 Additionally, our official conception of courts sees
them as neutral adjudicators, rather than as agencies whose officers have
incentives or self-conceptions that might lead them to favor some social groups
over others. 28 It is accordingly not as necessary to prevent courts from taking note
of race as it might be to prevent other governmental actors from doing so, because
the danger that favoritism will result in unfair exercises of governmental power is
less. To be sure, none of these considerations would justify allowing a court to
violate the demands of equal protection. But in figuring out just what equal
protection demands of a court, the fact that the court is a court is a relevant
consideration. Partly because a certain degree of race-consciousness is necessary
for executing core judicial functions, and partly for other reasons related to the
judicial role, a legal system skeptical of race-conscious decisionmaking permits
courts more leeway than it permits other institutions.
Consider the contrast between courts and public universities that Justice Lewis
Powell articulated in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke. 29 In Justice
Powell's view, public universities' place in the American constitutional scheme
made it appropriate for those institutions to have some latitude in making
race-conscious admissions decisions, if the universities' purpose in paying
attention to race was in furtherance of their distinctive educational missions. so
not a product of the government's prior acts than if the government played a large role in creating
those hierarchies in the first place.
27

Equal protection has a similar tolerance for nonjudicial governmental actors executing
something like the judicial function of remediation. For example, an administrative office evaluating
an internal grievance alleging racial discrimination in a government agency would be permitted to
consider the race of the complainant in much the same way that a court could take note of the race
of a Title VII plaintiff. Interestingly, there is no serious account in caselaw of why constitutional
law's aversion to racial classifications is subject to this limit. One possibility is that the individualist
ideals that motivate colorblindness require at least this much color-consciousness for their
enforcement. But this is not a complete explanation, because one could easily ask why what is
required is this much, rather than a little more or a little less. Whether this conundrum is a problem
for prevailing practices or for the theory of colorblindness is a question for another day. For a related
discussion, see Justin Driver, Recognizing Race, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 404 (2012).
28

Like everybody else, judges can have biases, and a judiciary whose members are recruited
disproportionately from certain segments of the population might show biases in predictable
directions. But the design of the office is based on an aspiration to neutrality.
29
30

438 U.S. 265 (1978).
See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311-15 (opinion of Powell, J).
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Hence the diversity rationale for affirmative action in university admissions, as
articulated by Justice Powell in Bakke and later endorsed by the Court in Grutter
v. Bollinger. 31 But Justice Powell also wrote that universities should not have
similar latitude to pursue race-conscious admissions policies for the purpose of
curing past discrimination, because universities are as an institutional matter
poorly suited to make the kinds of findings about past conduct that must underlie
such policies-at least in the absence of particular guidance from appropriate
legislative, judicial, or administrative mandates.32
Public employers, like public universities, have substantially less latitude than
courts to craft race-conscious remedies for discrimination. Indeed, in the history
of disparate impact law, public employers have been among the institutions least
trusted to deal with race appropriately.33 For as long as courts have recognized
disparate-impact claims under Title VII, disparate-impact suits have been notoriously difficult for plaintiffs to win, with two categories of exceptions. First, in the
years immediately after Title VII became effective, courts often granted disparateimpact relief against Southern employers with histories of overt racial discrimination.34 Second, courts have periodically granted disparate-impact relief against
large municipal employers, especially in settings like police and fire departments.35 Such suits account for a large share of all successful disparate-impact
claims. 36 In many large cities, police and fire departments have been dominated
by members of white ethnic communities-Polish or Irish or Italian-that have
comprised important constituencies within reigning local political coalitions.
Partly because of the logic of patronage, and partly because of the natural
dynamics of self-perpetuation, new jobs in the departments have often gone
disproportionately to members of the incumbent ethnic community. As a result,
members of racial minority groups have often found it difficult to break in, even
31

539 U.S. 306 (2003).
See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307-10 (opinion of Powell, J).
33
See Michael Selmi, Was the Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake?, 53 UCLA L.
756-57 (2006).
32

REV.

701,

34
See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971); Parham v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 433
F.2d 421 (8th Cir. 1970); Young v. Edgcomb Steel Co., 363 F. Supp. 961 (M.D.N.C. 1973).
35
See, e.g., Boston Chapter, NAACP v. Beecher, 504 F.2d 1017 (1st Cir. 1974) (Boston);
Vulcan Soc'y of N.Y. City Fire Dep't v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 490 F.2d 387 (2d Cir. 1973) (New
York); United States v. City of Chicago, 385 F. Supp. 543 (N.D. Ill. 1974) (Chicago); Officers for
Justice v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 371 F. Supp. 1328 (N.D. Cal. 1973) (San Francisco); Harper v.
Mayor of Baltimore, 359 F. Supp. 1187 (D. Md. 1973) (Baltimore). There are recent examples as
well. See, e.g., United States v. City of New York, 637 F. Supp. 2d 77 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (granting
summary judgment against the New York City Fire Department in a Title VII suit alleging that a
written examination for selecting entry-level firefighters had an unlawfully disparate impact on
black and Hispanic applicants).
36
Selmi, supra note 33, at 756-57.
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in the absence of formal discrimination or official discriminatory purposes.37 In
the 1970s, this pattern furnished the backdrop for several successful disparateimpact suits against municipal employers, even as courts were showing themselves strongly disinclined to hold private employers liable in disparate-impact
cases.38
Then came an important shift. In the 1980s and 1990s, black and Latino voters
became increasingly important political constituencies in many of the same big
cities where the logic of local politics had previously been consistent with
maintaining police and fire departments as domains of white ethnic patronage. 39
Alongside their other incentives, therefore, urban political leaders developed
powerful interests in bringing more members of racial minority groups into
municipal offices, including in police and fire departments. 40 In the pursuit of that
new agenda, judicial compulsion was a valuable ally. Especially because
disparate-impact liability need not entail a finding of purposeful discrimination,
many cities were perfectly happy to be held liable for disparate-impact violations,
or to enter into consent decrees in suits brought on disparate-impact grounds, and
then to implement remedial decrees requiring increased minority hiring. 41
Integrating the departments served the interests of local decisionmakers, and
disparate-impact doctrine gave them the cover they needed to make it happen.
To the extent that this shift in political incentives reflected a larger share of the
urban population's being represented at the municipal table, it should be regarded
as a welcome change. But it means that courts in the twenty-first century are again
likely to be suspicious of the racial agendas of local officeholders in police and fire
department hiring, albeit sometimes from a different angle. Once the concern was
that local politics would keep blacks out of the jobs. Now, just as often, the
concern is that local leaders are playing politics by putting more blacks or Latinos
into those jobs. Justice Alito's concurrence in Ricci vividly channeled this anxiety,
37 See, e.g., Diane Cardwell, Racial Bias in Fire Exams Can Lurk in the Details, N.Y. Times,
July 24, 2009, at A22 (describing a recent suit where fire department entrance exams tested
knowledge of technical jargon, thus favoring those from traditional firefighter families or
English-speaking families).
38

See Selmi, supra note 33, at 756.

39 See, e.g.•

AFRICAN AMERICAN MAYORS: RACE, PoLmcs, AND THE AMERICAN CITY 4-6
(David R. Colburn & Jeffrey S. Adler eds., 2001); JON 'fEAFORD, THE 'fWENTIETH-CBN'I'URY
AMERICAN CITY: PROBLEM, PROMISE, AND REALITY 147 (1993); CLARENCE STONE, REGJME
POLITICS: GoVERNING ATLANTA, 1946-1988 247 (1989).
40

The shift in political demographics did not mean that urban officeholders no longer had
incentives to protect the interests of white ethnic groups in the allocation of public employment.
Often those incentives remained. But similar incentives also obtained with respect to the
employment of nonwhites. The precise balance of incentives in any particular case, or for any
particular official, is a function of specific circumstances within the relevant polity.
41

See Selmi, supra note 33, at 764.
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offering an ugly tale of racial politics as the context in which to see the issue
presented.42
One need not see the local officials who are inclined to go too far in the pursuit
of minority hiring as illicitly motivated. They might merely be officeholders
acting in good faith to pursue the welfare of their cities as they best understand it,
rather than being racially biased or intent on delivering political spoils along racial
lines. 43 One important insight of constitutional theory, however, is that officeholders charged with particular responsibilities might pay insufficient attention to
public values that argue against achieving those responsibilities in the most direct
way. 44 A standard solution is to check those officeholders by subjecting them to
the review of another institution that does not share the same incentives and
responsibilities. Consider the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement: Police
officers need judicial authorization to conduct certain kinds of searches because
the responsibility for investigating crime tempts officers to minimize privacy
concerns where the interest in privacy gets in the way of efficient and successful
investigations. 45 If investigating officers could decide on their own whether a
search was valid, they would predictably undervalue the privacy that the
Constitution protects, not for reasons of bad faith but simply because of what their
role as police officers asks them to accomplish. Similarly, many public employers
in racially diverse municipalities face a systematic temptation to use the threat of
disparate-impact liability to practice race-conscious hiring beyond what the law
condones. This fact about public employer incentives might make it sensible to
prohibit those employers from implementing disparate-impact remedies without
the review and direction of a court-or, perhaps, an administrative body executing
42

See Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2683-88 (2009) (Alito, J., concurring).

43

Ricci' s willingness to let employers escape disparate treatment liability with a strong basis in
evidence for believing that the alternative is a disparate impact violation-rather than requiring a
completely clear showing that the alternative is such a violation-indicates some measure of
willingness to give public employers margin for error. Clearly, the Court does not see every public
employer as bent on subverting the law, and the institutional reading of Ricci does not require such
a dim view. It requires only that courts see a greater need for checking public employers than there
is for checking courts.
44
For one excellent modem distillation of this idea in the Supreme Court's jurisprudence,
relying partly on James Madison, see Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 545 (2004) (Souter, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in the judgment) (''For reasons of inescapable
human nature, the branch of the Government asked to counter a serious threat is not the branch on
which to rest the Nation's entire reliance in striking the balance between the will to win and the cost
in liberty on the way to victory; the responsibility for security will naturally amplify the claim that
security legitimately raises. A reasonable balance is more likely to be reached on the judgment of
a different branch, just as Madison said in remarking that 'the constant aim is to divide and arrange
the several offices in such a manner as that each may be a check on the other-that the private
interest of every individual may be a sentinel over the public rights."') (quoting The Federalist No.
51 (James Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961)).

45

I thank Trevor Morrison for suggesting this example.
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an investigatory or adjudicatory function.
As I have described in depth elsewhere, the Ricci Court departed in several
ways from the normal mode of adjudicating disparate-impact cases under Title
Vll.46 One of the Court's most overt departures can best be understood in terms
of this understanding of the incentives of public employers. According to Title
vn. the defendant in a disparate-impact case can escape liability by showing that
the employment practice with a racially disparate impact is "job related . . . and
consistent with business necessity."47 The statute places the burden of proof on the
employer to show business necessity, not on the plaintiff to show that the practice
is arbitrary. 48 That allocation of the burden makes sense on the generally sound
assumption that employers prefer not to be held liable for Title Vil violations.
After all, the employer has the best access to information about why it deploys the
challenged practice. If the employer also has a strong incentive to defend that
practice-for example, to escape liability-then all considerations argue for
giving the employer the burden of proof. But if a public employer's interest in
increased minority hiring means that it prefers to be held liable, giving the burden
of proof to the employer enables that employer to let a weak claim succeed simply
by declining to argue the business necessity defense.
In Ricci, a public employer that wanted to implement a race-conscious remedy
for the disparate impact of the written tests it administered denied that those tests
were required by business necessity. 49 Had the Court mechanically applied Title
VIl's burdens of proof, it would have been forced to conclude that the potential
disparate-impact claim against the city would have succeeded. There was a
statistically disparate impact, and the city of New Haven would clearly not satisfy
its burden to show business necessity if its position was that the tests were
unnecessary. But perhaps because the Court was aware that the city's incentives
were the reverse of what the statute supposed, the majority opinion treated the
absence of business necessity as an element of a disparate-impact claim, rather
than regarding business necessity as an affirmative defense that the employer
might or might not invoke.50 The language of Title Vil makes business necessity
an affirmative defense,51 so the Court's analysis required some unacknowledged
46

See Primus, The Future of Disparate Impact, supra note 4, at 1354-62.

47

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(l)(A)(i) (2006).

48

Id.

49

129 S. Ct. at 2678 (noting and rejecting New Haven's assertion that the promotion test was
not job related and consistent with business necessity).
50
Or, more broadly, perhaps the Court reallocated the burden not because of any particular sense
it bad about this case but because courts have been informally reallocating that burden as a matter
of course for years, partly in response to the shift in incentives here described. See Selmi, supra note
33, at 749.
51
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(l)(A)(i) (stating that a violation of Title VII is established when a
statistically disparate impact is shown and ''the respondent fails to demonstrate that the challenged
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surgery on the United States Code. But the Court's impulse to relocate the burden
arises sensibly from its recognition that under current conditions, a municipal
employer like New Haven might have incentives to engage in race-conscious
decisionmaking beyond that which a court would order to remedy authentic
disparate-impact violations.
At the constitutional level, the Court's analysis would make even more sense.
There is no textual assignment of burdens to rewrite. Within equal protection
doctrine, courts routinely adopt standards that are sensitive to the question of how
far a certain kind of party should be trusted with a particular decision. The whole
system of tiers of scrutiny is an example.52 So if it is sensible for courts to worry
that large municipal employers will have political incentives to allocate public
employment along racial and ethnic lines, it is sensible for them to give those
employers close scrutiny in cases involving such employment, including cases
where the employers might be using Title VII as cover. Within that framework, it
makes sense for equal protection to be less tolerant of a public employer's
race-conscious actions taken to comply with Title VII than of a court's
race-conscious actions taken to enforce the same statute. On that institutional
reading, Title VII's disparate-impact doctrine is still constitutional, so long as it is
implemented by courts, or perhaps also by other neutral adjudicators such as
administrative agencies charged with combatting discrimination. Ricci would
mean only that employers that discover that their practices have disparate racial
impacts are less free to implement race-conscious remedies by themselves.

Inclusive Communities did not furnish an occasion for the Court to deal
frontally with the institutional reading's animating concerns. The case featured a
state agency denying liability for actions alleged to have a disparate racial impact,
not a state agency trying to implement a race-conscious remedy for an alleged or
potential disparate-impact violation. So perhaps the wisest reading of Inclusive
Communities would conclude that the case sheds little light on the viability or the
importance of the institutional reading. That said, the Court's opinion does make
one relevant and noteworthy reference to the role of municipal decisionmakers. In
its final paragraphs, in the name of assuring readers that a disparate-impact theory
of liability under the Fair Housing Act would not create horrible difficulties for
local officials, Justice Kennedy's majority opinion notes that "many of our
Nation's largest cities-entities that are potential defendants in disparate-impact
suits-have submitted an amicus brief in this case supporting disparate-impact
liability under the FHA."sa
Considered in light of the background described above, that sentence is curious.
practice is job related for the position in question and consistent with business necessity") (emphasis
added).
52 See, e.g., Larry D. Kramer, Foreword: We the Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 4, 14647 (2001).
53 Inclusive Communities, 192 L.Ed.2d at 540 (citing Brief for City of San Francisco et al. as
Amici Curiae).
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It seems to see the significance of the municipalities' amicus brief in the following
way: these municipalities are potential defendants in Fair Housing Act suits, and
they do not oppose a disparate-impact standard under the Act, so the harm that
such a standard might do must be limited. That line of reasoning makes sense on
the assumption that defendants want to reduce their exposure to liability-an
assumption that is probably warranted in most cases. But as noted above, many
officials in the Nation's large cities have been happy to be sued on disparateimpact theories, especially when the result is a negotiated consent decree that
gives local officials judicial cover for racially integrative (or otherwise racially
allocative) policies that might have been difficult to pursue without the overlay of
judicial compulsion.
The point should not be overstated. Municipal incentives are not uniform, and
getting sued can be nasty business. And there are a great many instances in which
disparate-impact suits against public agencies are unwanted, as the example of
Inclusive Communities demonstrates. Nevertheless, it is interesting that the Court
presented a brief by twenty-one municipalities in favor of a disparate-impact
standard under the Fair Housing Act as unproblematic evidence in favor of
recognizing such a standard. If the Court were aware of and concerned about the
dynamics underlying the institutional reading, one might expect the Justices to
hesitate at the thought that where disparate-impact standards are concerned, the
key interest of large municipal governments is the reduction of exposure to
liability. Instead, the Justices might have wondered whether the amicus
municipalities-the City of New Haven among them54-might be interested in
expanding disparate-impact liability, and in ways that might be at odds with equal
protection.
Perhaps this passage in Inclusive Communities means little. Given the realities
of amicus briefing at the Supreme Court, it is more than plausible that no Justice
read the municipalities' brief, even though five Justices signed an opinion citing
it. (The Court's opinion contains no indication of the substance of the argument
in the amicus brief; it simply notes the fact that the amicus municipalities are on
the side of a disparate-impact standard, which would be apparent even to a reader
who looked at the front cover of the brief and declined to open it.)55 The passage
may have been inserted merely as a debater's point, a quick way to respond to
arguments that recognizing disparate-impact liability under the Fair Housing Act
would be devastating to local governments. But if nothing else, it suggests the
limited salience to Justice Kennedy of the concern that local officials might
54

The brief was filed on behalf of San Francisco, Atlanta, Baltimore, Boston, Birmingham (AL),
Carrboro (NC), Chapel Hill, Columbia (SC), Dubuque, Durham, Flint, Los Angeles, Memphis,
Miami, Miami Gardens, New Haven, New York City, Oakland, Philadelphia, Seattle, and Toledo
and King County, Washington. To say the least, New Haven is not the only municipality on this list
whose urban politics feature racial dynamics of a kind that would play into the institutional reading.
55 Inclusive Communities, 192 L.Ed.2d at 540.
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manipulate disparate-impact frameworks as cover for an unconstitutional politics
of racial allocation. Presented with a case raising the issue squarely, as in Ricci,
he might react. But if the problem is a bit offstage, it does not seem to command
much attention.

Il.

The Vmibility Reading

As colorblindness has become increasingly dominant as the metaphor guiding
equal protection, center-right constitutional actors have often drawn a distinction
between race-conscious measures whose race-consciousness is broadly visible
and race-conscious measures whose race-consciousness operates deeper in the
background, thus reducing its salience to some real or imagined audience. 56
Justice Kennedy is an important example. In Parents Involved in Community
Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, he wrote that school districts seeking
racially integrated student bodies could pursue that end with formally race-neutral
means, like choosing where to locate schoqls or how to draw district lines, even
though school districts were not permitted to achieve the same end by overtly
using the race of particular students as decisional criteria. 57 Another important
example is former President George W. Bush. As Governor of Texas, Bush
approved a plan under which the University of Texas admitted all in-state
undergraduate applicants who graduated in the top 10 percent of their high school
classes.58 The Ten Percent Plan was designed to secure substantial minority
admission after a facially classificatory affirmative action program was struck
down as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. 59 In a world where high
schools are assigned on the basis of residence and people's places of residence are
highly correlated with their racial backgrounds, taking students from every high
school will predictably ensure racial diversity. When the Bush Administration's
Justice Department urged the Supreme Court to disallow the University of
Michigan's affirmative action plans, it pointed to the Ten Percent Plan as a model
for better altematives.ao

If all race-conscious government action were equally objectionable, Justice
Kennedy's and President Bush's recommendations would be senseless. The Ten
Percent Plan was adopted with the purpose of altering the racial allocation of
social goods, and the school-siting or district-drawing measures that Justice
Kennedy envisioned would be as well. But the race-conscious aspects of these
policies are not as visible on their surface as the race-conscious aspects of the
56
57

See Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate Impact, supra note 2, at 539-44.
See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 787-89 (2007)

(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
58

59
60

See Texas Education Code, Title 3, § 51.803 (1997).
See Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996).
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 14-18, Grutter v.

Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241).
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policies at issue in Grutter and Parents Involved. A school-siting plan need not
declare itself as racially motivated, even if it is, and the Ten Percent Plan is written
and describable without any mention of race, even though it is thoroughly
race-conscious in its purpose. Race influences the allocation of social goods in
both paradigms, but at a remove. Obviously and intentionally, the Ten Percent
Plan increases the proportion of African Americans who are admitted to the
University of Texas, and it decreases the proportion of admittees from other racial
groups. There are winners and losers in predictable racial patterns. But the official
formulation of the policy does not speak of race, and implementing the policy
does not require any decisionmaker to behave toward any specific individual in a
way shaped by that individual's race. Nor can it be said under the Ten Percent Plan
that a particular white applicant would have been admitted had he only been
black, that a particular black applicant would not have been admitted had she been
white. For all these reasons, the racially allocative aspect of the system may be
less publicly salient, and less likely to seem offensive to the ideals of individualism, than the kind of retail-level affirmative action at issue in cases like Grutter
and Parents Involved.
To be sure, the degree to which these potential differences in salience and social
meaning are realized depends on several fluid factors. Successful normentrepreneurs could, in principle, persuade the public that there is no moral
difference between the two kinds of programs. But as a general matter, it has not
worked out that way. At least at this point in history, many people who oppose
classificatory, retail-level affirmative action are comfortable with race-conscious
measures whose racial aspects are buried a bit deeper in the causal chain.
It is easy to think it senseless for people to commend one of these types of
policies while condemning the other. If one believes that all race-conscious
interventions are unacceptable, the distinction between policies whose racial
aspects are obvious and policies whose racial aspects are just as integral but not
as publicly salient might seem unprincipled, perhaps maddeningly so.61 From a
different normative perspective, one might argue that broad public tolerance of
measures like the Ten Percent Plan demonstrates the acceptability of raceconscious decisionmaking, such that more visible race-conscious interventions
should be permitted as well. 62 Either of these views has analytic integrity. But
whatever their appeal in terms of logical consistency or normative principle, equal
protection doctrine has not to date endorsed either perspective. It may instead
mediate between the two poles in roughly the way that Justice Kennedy and
61 See BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEoPLE: How PuBuc OPINION HAs INFLUENCED
THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION 340-41 (2010) (quoting

activists who hold this view).
62 Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg has memorably written that, "only an ostrich could regard the
supposedly neutral alternatives as race unconscious." See Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin,
133 S. Ct. 2411, 2433 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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President Bush have articulated. The Supreme Court has not squarely upheld
measures like the Ten Percent Plan, but important opinions from swing Justices
have commended them more than once.63
Indeed, the difference between more and less visible uses of race often seems
meaningful to relevant audiences even when the allocative consequences of the
second kind of race-conscious measure are as great as, or greater than, those of
more forthright kinds of affirmative action. Consider a telling feature of Fisher v.
University of Texas at Austin,64 now pending before the Supreme Court. The
University of Texas uses two separate systems to admit its undergraduate class.
One, which by law must fill at least seventy-five percent of the seats available to
in-state applicants, is the Ten Percent Plan.65 The other process, called the holistic
review program,66 fills the remaining seats. Holistic review considers more or less
the same broad range of factors that most selective colleges consider: high school
records, test scores, letters of recommendation, essays, and a variety of other
information that might reflect applicants' academic and personal capacities,
including (or as well as) demographic infonnation such as race. 67 Abigail Fisher,
the plaintiff in Fisher v. Texas, graduated from a Texas high school but not within
the top ten percent of her class. She applied for admission, was considered under
the holistic review process, and was rejected. Her suit challenges the use of race
within the holistic review process, but it raises no challenge to the Ten Percent
Plan.• Indeed, Fisher's argument against the constitutionality of affirmative
action in the holistic review process assumes the continued operation of the Ten
Percent Plan. To boil it down, she argues that University's compelling interest in
enrolling a racially diverse student body (recognized in Grutter) does not require
(and therefore does not authorize) the use of affirmative action within holistic
63
See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 787-89
(2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); City of Richmond v. J.A.
Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 507 (1989) (plurality opinion).
64 See Fisher v. Univ. of Texas, 2015 U.S. LBxis 4294, 83 U.S.L.W. 3928 (U.S. June 29, 2015)
(order granting certiorari).
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The plan as it now operates has been modified in a way that makes its popular name atavistic:
the University still admits the top graduates of every Texas high school class, but ''top" no longer
means "top ten percent." Instead, the cutoff percentile varies a bit from year to year, depending on
the University's calculation as to what cutoff will cause the process to fill 75% of the incoming class.
See Texas Education Code, Title 3, § 51.803(a-1) (2013). Nonetheless, the Ten Percent label has
stuck.
66

67

See Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, 758 F.3d 633, 637 (5th Cir. 2014).

The University introduced holistic review as an adjunct to the Ten Percent Plan after the
Supreme Court's decision in Grutter nullified the prior lower-court ruling barring the University
from considering race in undergraduate admissions. The use of race in holistic review is not in all
respects identical to its use in the Michigan Law School system upheld in Grutter, but it was
designed to be defensible under Grutter.
68
See Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, 758 F.3d 633, 633-37 (5th Cir. 2014).
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review, because the Ten Percent Plan admits enough nonwhite students to make
the University racially diverse. 69
The plaintiff's argument in Fisher is plausible, as are various counterarguments.
But for present purposes, what matters is not how the Court should resolve that
important contest. Instead, what is instructive here is that Fisher is challenging a
facially classificatory affirmative action program that was almost certainly not the
cause of her being rejected by the University of Texas, and she is not challenging
a race-conscious program-the Ten Percent Plan-that may well have been a
but-for cause of her rejection.
Given the relative strength (or weakness) of her application within the applicant
pool, Abigail Fisher would not have been admitted to the University of Texas
through holistic review even if the University had not considered race within that
process-assuming, of course, that all other aspects of the admissions process
were held constant. 7 Fisher was not eligible for admission under the Ten Percent
Plan, because she did not graduate within the top ten percent of her high school
class. She was therefore considered under the holistic review process. That
process is selective: it takes a strong candidate to succeed, and Fisher's
application was not strong enough. Nor was her application strong enough to have
succeeded if the holistic review process had been race-blind, nor even if she had
been black or Latino and gotten a bump up for her racial background. 71

°

But the stringency of the quality standard within holistic review is a function of
the Ten Percent Plan. An admissions standard responds to the law of supply: the
more seats there are available, the easier it is to get in. The Ten Percent Plan thus
raises the bar for all applicants not graduating in the top ten percent of their
classes, because it ensures that such applicants are competing for many fewer
seats than would be available in a world without the Ten Percent Plan. (In the year
when Fisher applied, the Ten Percent Plan accounted for 81 % of all in-state
admissions, leaving all Texas high school graduates not graduating in the top ten
percent of their high school graduates to compete for just 19% of the seats.)72
Were there no Ten Percent Plan, an applicant in Fisher's position would confront
a much less forbidding path to admission.
The Ten Percent Plan is quite clearly motivated by a race-conscious purpose. It
aims to (and actually does) increase the enrollment of black and Latino students.
That necessarily entails a reduction in the enrollment of applicants from other
racial backgrounds-in practice, white applicants like Fisher and also Asian
applicants. And yet Fisher attacks the holistic review process rather than the Ten
69

See Fisher, 758 F.3d 633 (5th Cir. 2014).

70 See Fisher v. University

of Texas at Austin, 758 F.3d 633, 637-38 (5th Cir. 2014). The Fifth
Circuit nonetheless held that Fisher nonetheless has standing to pursue her claim. Id. at 639-40.
71

Id. at 639.

72

Id. at 650.
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Percent Plan. The race-conscious policy she asks the courts to invalidate is the one
that was factually inconsequential for her but within which the racial aspect is
explicit, rather than the more consequential measure where the racial aspect lies
below the smface.
The idea that equal protection should respond to what is visible about a
government practice is not merely a compromise or a failure to reason. It has a
logic. Visibility drives social meaning; what a practice means to some audience
depends on what the audience perceives about the practice. Officially, of course,
· the doctrinal concerns of equal protection are about purpose and form, not about
social meaning. Governmental practices are treated as suspect if their have
discriminatory purposes73 or if they classify in disfavored ways. 74 But in the end,
these official concerns sometimes fail to capture what is important in the realm of
constitutional equality. From time to time, the Court comes up against those
limits, acknowledges them. and considers also what a governmental practice
means. Examples range from Strauder v. West Virginia 75 and Brown v. Board of
Education, 76 where the Court took note of the white-supremacist meanings of the
laws at issue, to modem affirmative action cases where the Court worried that
well-intentioned programs would feed racial stigma or teach people to think of
themselves in racial terms. 77 Social meanings are often multiple and contested,
73

See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (stating that heightened scrutiny under
equal protection analysis requires a showing of discriminatory purpose rather than discriminatory
impact).
74
See, e.g., Adarand v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (holding that all governmental uses of express
racial classifications trigger strict scrutiny). What constitutes an "express racial classification" is
sometimes less clear than doctrine officially lets on. See Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate
Impact, supra note 2, at 502-15 (2003) (showing that "express racial classification" is a term of art,
or a legal judgment rather than a merely factual one, because judicial determinations that particular
practices do or do not make use of express racial classifications are themselves often parasitic on
implicit normative judgments about the propriety of the practices at issue).
75
100 U.S. 303, 308 (1880) (describing the practice of excluding blacks from juries as
"practically a brand upon them . . . an assertion of their inferiority").
76
347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954) (explaining that legal segregation was "usually interpreted as
denoting the inferiority of the negro group'').
77
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 228-29 (1995) (arguing that racial
classifications, even when made with "good intentions," raise equal protection problems because
they will be perceived to rest on stigmatizing assumptions about the benefited groups); id. at 241
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) ("So-called 'benign' discrimination
teaches many that because of chronic and apparently immutable handicaps, minorities cannot
compete with them without their patronizing indulgence. Inevitably, such programs engender
attitudes of superiority or, alternatively, provoke resentment among those who believe that they have
been wronged by the government's use of race. These programs stamp minorities with a badge of
inferiority ....");Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 643 (1993) (explaining that legal classifications by
race "threaten to stigmatize individuals by reason of their membership in a racial group"); Croson,
488 U.S. at 493-94 (plurality opinion) (focusing on the danger of stigmatic harm resulting from
racial classifications).
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such that it is hard to operationalize a reliable doctrine that focuses on them
directly. 78 But that means that the issue is slippery, not that the concern is
misplaced.
The concern that a practice marks a group as inferior is a concern about social
meaning, as is the concern that the government sees people as members of racial
groups rather than as individuals. These concerns have been core matters of equal
protection, and appropriately so. Equal protection aims to reduce the public
salience of race. 79 When considering the constitutionality of a race-conscious
policy, it is therefore useful to ask whether the measure will reduce or exacerbate
racial divides within the American public.80 Salience is a function of perceptions,
and perceptions are affected by the meanings attached to visible practices.
Reducing racial divides therefore calls for sensitivity not just to what is done or
what is intended but what is publicly understood.
To be sure, there would be something odd about a doctrine on which a practice
can be permitted as long as the damage it does is hidden. But treating differentially
visible practices differently need not be about hiding the damage. It might be
about reducing the damage, inasmuch as a large part of the harm that raceconscious interventions cause operates at the level of public social meaning. A
person who does not get a promotion that he would have gotten but for the
operation of a disparate-impact remedy suffers practical disadvantage whether or
not the race-conscious factor is publicly known. But if the race-conscious aspect
is visible and given a divisive social meaning, the disparate-impact remedy causes
a further harm at the societal level. The problem then is not just the particular
individual's loss of a promotion but the exacerbation of race as a source of tension
and ill-feeling in the polity at large.
The Texas Legislature seems to understand that publicly accessible meaning is
an important factor in the acceptability, vel non, of a race-conscious policy. In an
attempt to limit the salience of the Ten Percent Plan, it has adopted a remarkable
rule limiting communication about that policy. In 2009, when the Legislature
78
See, e.g., DONALD R. KINDER & LYNN M. SANDERS, DIVIDED BY COLOR: RACIAL POLmcs
AND DEMOCRATIC IDEALS 295-303 (1996) (using public opinion data to demonstrate the divide
between the ways that whites and blacks perceive the meanings of legal policies).
79
See, e.g., Inclusive Communities, 192 L.Ed.2d at 539 (speaking of the Nation's "quest to
reduce the salience of race in our social and economic system"); id. at 538-39 ("Difficult questions
might arise if disparate-impact liability under the FHA clause race to be used and considered in a
pervasive and explicit manner to justify governmental or private actions that, in fact, tend to
perpetuate race-based considerations rather than move beyond them."); Gmtter v. Bollinger, 539
U.S. 306, 343 (2003) (expressing the hope that race-conscious policies necessary in 2003 would not
be necessary in the future); Croson, 488 U.S. at 495 (plurality opinion) (stating that equal protection
should be construed so as to diminish the relevance of race in American life over time).
80

For the development of one important version of this idea, see Reva Siegel, From

Colorblindness to Antibalkanization: An Emerging Ground ofDecision in Race Equality Cases, 120
YALE L.J. 1278 (2011).
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authorized the current two-track admissions system,81 the Legislature also barred
the University from mentioning the Ten Percent Plan in rejection letters sent to
applicants considered under holistic review. 82 This gag rule is a bit Orwellian, but
it has a clear rationale. In a world where roughly four-fifths of all the entering
places at the University of Texas are filled through the Ten Percent Plan, large
numbers of applicants from affluent suburban high schools will be rejected. Many
such students were also rejected before the Ten Percent Plan, of course, but the
Ten Percent Plan drives the proportion much higher. These rejections could easily
provoke anger among the parents of those applicants, many of whom are
University alumni,u otherwise well-connected in their communities, or both. One
can easily imagine admissions officers in Austin deciding to parry "How-couldyou-reject-my-kid" complaints by explaining, as a general matter, that the issue
was largely out of their hands and in any event that rejection is no ill reflection on
an applicant. Given the Ten Percent Plan, the letter would say, it's just crazy hard
to get into UT Austin, and we're sorry not to be able to accept so many excellent
candidates.
But once one imagines admissions officers talcing that step, it's just as easy to
imagine the step that comes next. A letter explaining that such an applicant's
rejection is a function of-the fault of-the Ten Percent Plan practically invites
white suburban parents across the state to demonize that plan, which is keeping
their kids out of UT. White suburban outrage makes things hot for state
legislatures. And when the legislation outraging white suburban parents is
motivated by a racially allocative purpose, it is only a matter of time-and not
much time-before the political reaction is racialized. "The Legislature is taking
the University away from kids like ours and giving it to black and Latino kids with
lower test scores." Presumably and understandably, the Legislature wanted to
forestall that conversation, or at least to keep the volume as low as possible. In
short, the political viability of the Ten Percent Plan depends substantially on
preventing its racial aspect from becoming its most socially salient feature.
Noticing the importance of how the Ten Percent Plan is framed (or hidden) at
the moment of an applicant's rejection suggests a larger point about the visibility
of the race-conscious aspects of government actions. Specifically, one predictable
81

Prior to 2009, there was no limit on the proportion of seats in an incoming class that could be
filled through the Ten Percent Plan. Since 2009, the University has been authorized to cap admission
under that plan at 75% of the incoming class. See Texas Education Code, Title 3, § 51.803(a-1)
(2013).
82

See Texas Education Code, Title 3, § 51.803(i) (2013) ("If [the University] denies admission
to an applicant . . . in any letter or other communication the institution provides to the applicant
notifying the applicant of that denial, the institution may not reference the provisions of this section,
including using a description of a provision of this section such as the top 10 percent automatic
admissions law, as a reason the institution is unable to offer admission[.]").
83 The University does not consider legacy status in its admissions process. See Texas Education
Code, Title 3, § 51.803(a-4) (2013).
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way for the race-conscious aspect of a governmental practice to acquire a divisive
social meaning is for the practice to create visible victims. Visible victims lend
themselves to easily understood narratives of injustice, as every good plaintiffs'
lawyer knows. To be sure, some instances of race-conscious decisionma.king
become publicly salient and carry divisive social meanings even in the absence of
visible victims.84 But the existence of visible victims greatly increases the
probability that a race-conscious practice will become publicly salient and
divisively so.
The facts of Ricci illustrated the enormous difference in social meanings that
can attend the difference between race-conscious interventions that do not create
visible victims and race-conscious interventions that do. As became famous, New
Haven's decision to discard the results of the fire department's promotion tests
was animated by race-conscious motives. What is less famous is that the original
design and administration of those tests was also thoroughly race-conscious. But
only the decision to discard the results created an identifiable set of victims, and
only that decision became divisive.
As the Supreme Court in Ricci understood, New Haven's fire department tests
were designed in a race-conscious process.85 The city strove to create tests that
would both identify qualified officers and allow the promotion of significant
numbers of nonwhite firefighters. In this respect, the promotion tests were racially
conscious on the model of the Texas Ten Percent Plan. Unlike the Ten Percent
Plan, New Haven's strategy failed to produce the desired racial allocation among
the pool of successful applicants. But the city's choice of test likely affected which
white firefighters scored well enough to be promoted. Had the test design process
not been race-conscious, the tests would have asked a different set of questions,
and the seventeen top scorers would probably not have been exactly the same
people who earned the seventeen top scores under the tests that were actually
administered. Quite straightforwardly, all the firefighters who might have been
promoted under a test that had been designed with no race-consciousness but who
did not score well enough to be promoted under the actual 2003 tests were
disadvantaged by the race-conscious decision of a public actor. It is very hard,
however, to know who those disadvantaged firefighters are. And in the absence of
visible victims, the race-consciousness involved in designing the tests did not give
rise to divisive social meanings about government actions intended to allocate
84 The race-conscious electoral districting at issue in cases like Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630
(1993), may be an example: it is notoriously difficult to identify the determinate individual victims
of such practices. See generally Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, Standing and Misunderstanding in Voting Rights Law, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2276 (1998). I thank Nathaniel Persily for
pressing this point.
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See, e.g., Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2678 (explaining that the municipal consultant entrusted with
designing the test made sure that "minorities were overrepresented" among the people designing the
test).
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social goods on the basis of race, even though the tests were deliberately designed
to foster a certain racial distribution of promotions.
Like most facts about the social meanings of particular events, this one is only
contingently true. If norm-entrepreneurs had noticed and publicized the raceconsciousness of New Haven's test design, they might have been able to persuade
a public audience that the race-consciousness involved in the design of the tests
was illegal. Whether they could succeed in malcing the test-design process seem
discriminatory would depend on complex and fluid aspects of the relevant public
conversation. But the absence of visible victims-that is, of people whose
disadvantage is already intuitively perceived by the public before the normentrepreneurs go to work-would make it more difficult to present the tests in a
racially divisive light. And for now, even audiences suspicious of race-conscious
decisionmalcing tend to accept the kind of race-consciousness that informed the
design of New Haven's tests. The Ricci plaintiffs and the Supreme Court both
deemed respecting the results of those tests to be tantamount to judging applicants
on their merits as individuals, not as implementing a system that was designed
with racial considerations in mind 86 As a matter of social meaning, the fact that
the tests were designed to promote a certain racially calibrated outcome all but
disappeared.
In contrast, the race-conscious aspect of New Haven's decision to discard the
results of the test became enormously and divisively salient, and its creation of
visible victims was an important part of the reason why. Scrapping the test after
it was administered and graded highlighted a specific set of innocent firefighters
at risk of being adversely affected. There was no need for norm-entrepreneurs
interested in pushing public sensibilities farther toward colorblindness in government to re-educate an audience to make it see the city's decision as disadvantaging
people on the basis of race. That work was already done. Within the common
sense of the day, the victims were identifiable, and their victimization occurred in
plain view. As the Court put it, "the firefighters saw their efforts invalidated by the
City in sole reliance upon race-based statistics."87 The language of sight may or
may not have been intended to make this point, but the point is there: the publicly
visible impact of New Haven's race-conscious decisionmaking was central to the
86 See Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2677 (characterizing each test-taker's interest in having the test results
applied as originally planned as a "legitimate expectation not to be judged on the basis of race");
Petitioners' Brief on the Merits at 2, Ricci, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (No. 07-1428) (''Our Constitution
envisions a society in which race does not matter and individuals are judged on the strength of their
character."); id. at 3 ("Petitioners qualified for promotion under a race-blind, merit-selection
process.").
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Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2676 (2009) (emphasis added). From a different
perspective, it is misleading to say that the city acted in "sole" reliance on race-based statistics. If
one credits the city's account, it acted on race-based statistics in combination with its understanding
of its legal obligations under federal statute. But this point may not affect what the firefighters "saw"
from their own perspective.
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ill feeling that surrounded the whole event. By the time the Supreme Court
decided the case, one of the circuit judges who had sustained New Haven's actions
below-then-Judge Sonia Sotomayor-had been nominated to the Supreme
Court. Her nomination and confirmation hearings raised the affair's visibility even
further, extending the audience nationwide. All in all, the storm around Ricci
presented an object lesson in the divisive power of visible race-conscious
interventions.
In the most recent Supreme Court Term, Inclusive Communities again sounded
the basic concerns of the visibility paradigm as they apply to disparate-impact
standards. Justice Kennedy's majority opinion spoke of the danger that a system
of disparate-impact liability, if not properly limited, might "tend to perpetuate
race-based considerations rather than move beyond them."88 To prevent that
scenario, "Courts should avoid interpreting disparate-impact liability to be so
expansive as to inject racial considerations into every housing decision."89 And in
those cases where courts do find disparate-impact liability, they must strive to
design remedies that "eliminate racial disparities through race-neutral means"
rather than through the use of "racial targets or quotas[.]''90 Otherwise, the
disparate-impact standard "would set our Nation back in its quest to reduce the
salience of race in our social and economic system."91
Fortunately, and perhaps not coincidentally, the standard judicial remedies for
statutory disparate-impact violations are sensitive to the concern with visibility.
They avoid creating the sort of identifiable and concretely injured third-party
victims whose narratives might raise the salience of a race-conscious governmental intervention. Successful disparate-impact plaintiffs can win forward-looking
injunctive relief to end offending practices, but people who have already benefited
from practices found to violate the disparate-impact rule are never required to
disgorge their benefits.92 No hirings or promotions are retrospectively undone.
Disparate-impact plaintiffs under Title VII can win backpay or other equitable
monetary relief, but those remedies run only against employers and not against
innocent third parties. 93 Nor, outside the context of consent decrees, do judicially
imposed disparate-impact remedies make use of racial targets or quotas, as Justice
Kennedy cautions they ought not to do-and the use of such remedies even within
consent decrees is already largely a thing of the past. All of this suggests that
disparate-impact doctrine is sensitive to the visibility concern. It alters the racial
88

Inclusive Communites, 192 L.Ed.2d at 539.
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92 See In re Employment Discrimination Litig., 198 F.3d 1305, 1315-16 (11th Cir. 1999)
(explaining remedies).
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allocation of social goods, but in a relatively quiet and nondivisive way.
On a visibility reading of the caselaw, then, equal protection limits disparateimpact remedies to those that minimize the visibility of their own raceconsciousness-including, perhaps crucially, by avoiding the imposition of
concrete costs on determinate and innocent third parties. To date, the standard
judicial remedies for disparate-impact violations have stayed within that limit.
The facts of Ricci presented. disparate-impact doctrine more divisively, and on
those facts the Court found a problem. But on the visibility reading, Ricci poses
no threat to the normal operation of disparate-impact doctrine as codified in Title
VII. And Inclusive Communities suggests that visibility, rather than any paradigm
more threatening to disparate-impact doctrine, is indeed the animating concern.

Conclusion

Inclusive Communities indicates that the most wooden reading of Ricci-what
I called the general reading-does not seem likely to be animating the Supreme
Court's sense of the relationship between constitutional equal protection and
statutory disparate-impact standards. The institutional and visibility readings of
Ricci are better guides, both for explaining what the Court has done and for
thinking about how future problems will be analyzed. As a result, statutory
disparate-impact standards like those in Title VII and the Fair Housing Act will
survive, leaving aside as always the question of how changes in the composition
of the Court might alter future doctrine.
That said, statutory disparate-impact standards will survive in partly truncated
form, as compared to what they once were. On either the institutional reading or
the visibility reading, public employers might not be permitted to invoke Title VII
to suspend employment practices in midstream, even if those practices do in fact
violate the disparate-impact prong of Title VII. In the Fair Housing context,
Inclusive Communities repeatedly suggests a vision of disparate-impact analysis
that will make it very hard for plaintiffs to win cases-not that it has been easy
up until now. 94 Still, these limitations are less far-reaching, both practically and
symbolically, than a flat declaration of unconstitutionality would be. How these
limitations bear in practice will only become clear through the adjudication of the
next round of disparate-impact cases-adjudication that may well take place on a
doctrinal landscape where the Court's concerns with visibility in equal protection
are re-presented, in ways that cannot be completely foreseen, in the forthcoming
decision in Fisher.
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For example, Inclusive Communities suggests that a defendant in a disparate-impact case
under the Fair Housing Act can escape liability by showing that the challenged practice was
motivated by "a legitimate rationale." Inclusive Communities, 192 L.Ed.2d at 527. What the
threshold for deeming a rationale to be legitimate might be is something that cannot be known for
certain in the advance of further litigation, but the formulation sounds less demanding than the
parallel formulation under Title VII, which uses the language of "business necessity." See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(k)(l)(A)(i) (2006).

